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of Thai rice problems in the long run is a timely topic
for this conference. Thailand has been an important rice producer and
Y
coi:sumerfor centuries, and a major rice exporter for about 12G years.
There have been disruptions in production or exports or both in the
past, with those during and after World War II perhaps the most severe
~
since the fall of Ayuthia. In each case recovery from the disruption
ccmsisted of returning to the old way, i.e. “weathering out the storm”
~r,tilthe situation returned to normal. However the forces underlying
tl~.changes in food grain production, (the green revolution)$ marketing,
ana international trade during the past several years are fundamentally
diiferent than those behind previous disruptions. Therefore ii the
:Iljustrnents are to be to the benefit of Thailand, different strategies
TF,Ispaper was initially prepared as a background paper for the
Annual Conference of the Agricultural Economics Society of T+,ailand
on “Thai Rice Problems in the Long Run.” Scheduled for Nov~mber 20,
1571, the Conference has been postponed.
Visiting Professor of Agricultural Economics at Kasetsart and
Thammasat Universities.
It is generally considered that the Bowring Treaty of 1855 with
Great Britain opened Thailand up to international trade or.a
significant scale (Corden & Richter p. 128). There is evidence that
some rice was being exported prior to that (Ingram p. 37).
In 1767.-2-
tharipreviously used may be called for.
paper is that Thai rice problems in the
in the context of the management of the
technology in agriculture in Thailand.
briefly reviewed, with attention to the
The
long
central thesis of this
run should be dealt with
adaption and creation of new
First the current situation is
legacy of past policies (particularly
the rice premium) as they affect possibilities for resource adjustment.
The discussion then centers around resource endowments, and factors
which may affect resource mobility. The paper concludes with some
?olicy suggestions.
The Leqacy of the Past
A conference on Thai rice problems
there are or will be problems with Thai




remark that for the past 120 years, or at least up until several years
ago, Thailand seems to have done pretty well with rice as a means of
agricultural growth. Thailand had a particular resource situation
resulted in enough rice production above domestic needs to permit
sizeable exports, which earned large amounts of foreign exchange.
that
Thailand did all of this while, since 1950, taxing rice exports heavily
through the “rice premium” to finance the government and keep rice
prices TO urban consumers very low. The particular resource situation
that permitted this was one with much land relative to population. Some of
this land was well suited to rice production. The population was mostly
rural, so that it didn’t take much of the producers’ marketable surplus-3-
t. reed urban people, leaving the rest for export. There was also little
alternative use for most of the resources employed in rice production
especially the land resource. As the population increased there was
new land available to open up. This land for the most part was not well
suited to rice, but it was suited to corn or cassava or kenaf, and so
the production of these crops boomed, resulting in the rapid growth
of aggregate agricultural output in the 1950’s and 1960’s. ( 9 )
Thailand was able to do this for several reasons. First and fore-
most of course was the resourcefulness and industriousness of her farmers!
a fact which still remains true, and one which is sometimes overlooked
by policy makers. Second, most of the other rice exporting countries
with similar levels of economic development, per capita income, etc.,
were all using the same rice production technology, namely a traditional
technology. The importers were also using a low level of technology,
and so at this low level equilibrium, there was generally a market for
most of the rice Thailand wanted to export. The important point is
that Thailand had a strong comparative advantage in rice production,
based on a lack of alternative production possibilities on her rice land.
The use of the rice premium as an export tax to keep domestic rice
prices below world levels undoubtedly had an effect on the patterriof
resource use in agriculture which exists at the present time. The
major effect was probably a lower level of capital formation and accumula-
tion on rice farms than would have occurred if rice prices to farmers
would have been higher. The many forms of physical capital accumulation,-4-
:uch as land leveling, irrigation and drainage ditch construction at the
farm level, and other land improvements which increase the degree of
water control in the individual paddys, just didn’t occur. To some extent
however this effect was offset by transferring capital through the
export tax to public sector investments in things farmers cannot do
individually, i.e. roads, big dams
Low rice prices also affected
of the population increase in rice
land. This has had three distinct
and major irrigation structures.
labor use within agriculture. Much
growing areas migrated to open up new
consequences. It resulted in the rapid
expansion of the output of upland crops, much of which was exported.
It led to a more extensive form of rice production practices in rice
growing areas than would likely have occurred if part of that labor
had stayed and farmed rice more intensively. The third consequence was
connected to capital formation in that labor migrated rather than make
labor intensive rice land improvements. Although this resulted in lower
capital formation on rice farms, it led to considerable capital formation
in land clearing on upland farms.
Low rice prices probably had the least effect on land use within
major rice growing areas, because the technical possibilities of shift-
ing land use out of rice were so limited that low rice prices probably
did not reduce the area plante,dto rice. This aspect will be discussed
later in the paper.
The Current Situation
The problems facing Thailand at the start of the 1970’s, however,-5-
arc considerably different than the previous situation. The rest of
the world has changed, and Thailand has to change to keep up with it.
These changes have been technological, economic, and political. Tech-
nological change, the “green revolution”, consists of the rapid adoption
of new production technology in se,veralcereals in localized areas in
2/
set~eralparts of the world, This has depressed world prices and the
domestic prices of these products except in a few countries where high
farm price support policies have been followed.
World prices have been adjusting fairly rapidly to
supplies forthcoming as a result of the new technology,




April, 1971, marked the lowest rice export prices for Thailand in 20 years,
and it was hard to find cash buyers even at these prices. Consequently,
some credit sales were made. Low rice prices, high corn prices, and
y Although the “revolution” usually referred to in “green revolution”
is the doubling or tripling of yield per hectare, I feel that there







confidence of researchers that a well funded, team-work
organized, commodity research program with clear cut
objectives and a problem focus can create new technology;
radical changes in popular and policy makers? views of
peasant farmers who have now demonstrated that if conditions
are right they are capable of rapid adoption of new technology
and rapid increases in output;
expectations of farmers regarding the incomes that they can
earn if conditions are right;
world grain markets and the price relationships between food
grains and feed grains.-6-
.om..surplus wheat being dumped resulted in severe price competition
between food grains (rice and wheat) and feed grains in some Southeast
Asian markets. Within Thailand, glutinous rice (paddy) was priced
lower than corn on a feed equivalent basis and consequently was being
fed to livestock. Thus in late April, 1971, the rice premium was abolished
on all grades except 100 and 5 per cent white, parboiled, and cargo rice
(six grades). The premium was also abolished later on the two grades
of parboiled. Not much cargo rice is exported, leaving the highest
quality as the only rice on which there is still a rice premium.
The rapid technological change in rice production in Asia, and
subsequent change in world rice prices! are predominate factors affecting
the future of rice in Thailand for the next ten years. There are a
wide range of relevant questions that need to be asked and answered irt
planning Thailand’s response to these long run problems. The rest of





What resources are currently employed in rice production?
What restraints prevent these resources from shifting as a
result of price changes from rice production to production
of other commodities with




provide a higher degree of resource
A iack of detailed knowledge about the resource base is a common-(-
prt,blemin developing countries, and Thailand is no exception. This
knowledge must be detailed enough to use in formulating policies to
facilitate production adjustments during times of rapid changes in tech-
nology in agriculture and subsequent changes in international markets
and prices. This lack is particularly serious for a substantial exporter
of agricultural products such as Thailand. Over the centuries traditional
agriculture evolved into a rather efficient user of the available resource
base, given traditional technology and relative factor prices. New
technology frequently disturbs this equilibrium, when it augments or
makes one factor of production more productive relative to other factors,
compared to the traditional equilibrium combination of factors. Resulting
changes in relative factor prices then tend to change the mix of resources
used in production. Although the market tends to transmit price signals
that lead to change, governments can establish policies that hasten
change or reduce burdens of producers in adjusting to change. Govern-
ments can hasten change by supporting research that will increase the
use of factors that are relatively abundant and, therefore, relatively
cheap in the economy. An example was the early 1950’s Thai government
support of corn r~~searchto use the abundant and cheap unclearea land.
i“heseconcepts are difficult to operationalize, because research
doesn’t always turn out as expected, and technological change may displace
labors wnich may already be the cheapest factor. If technological change
comes in from outsides the government can sometimes reduce bottlenecks
or ease constraints that limit adoption$ thus increasing resource
mobility. However, planners need good information to do this.-8”
Resource Realities in Thailand
Careful and effective evaluation of resources currently employed
in rice production, restraints that prevent or impede shifts to alter-
native uses, and policies and programs to increase resource mobility
also require a detailed look at each agro-climatic or agronomic zone
within the Kingdom. The four political regions or the six physiographic
regions are too broad. The 71 Changwats (provinces) are not useful as
agro-climatic areas because administrative boundaries rarely follow
major resource boundaries. An example of what is needed is Small’s
delineation of six agronomic regions within the Northern Greater Chao
Phya water control project area. (7) There are probably 15 to 20
major agro-climatic zones within Thailand. Most of them now produce
some rice. Each has a different resource base or endowment, different
restraints on shift of these resources to alternative uses, and different
potential and needs for new agricultural technology. (2,5) The thrust
of future development can only be speculative until these agro-
climatic zones are delineated, their resources inventoried, the most
important constraints determined! and the costs and methods of easing
the restraintsevaluated.
Speculations on Demand
I would now like to offer the following speculations on the pressures
on rice in Thailand in the next 10 years.
1. Thailand may be able to export from 1 to 1.5 million metric tons-9-
of rice per year, at prices no higher and maybe lower that at
present. Prices for high quality rice will be stronger than
for low qualities, with some of the lowest qualities being
diverted to feed grain uses.
2. Domestic demand for food $s likely to increase steadily at
about three per cent per year due to population increase.
3. Domestic demand for livestock feed will increase only slowly,
probably not over three to five per cent per year. Corn





lower, and most will continue to be exported. Production
sorghum will increase rapidly, with part exported
fed to livestock, displacing some of the market for
livestock feed.
4* Continuation of present rice yields will not be tolerable
(from general economic growth as well as political standpoints)
and so the objective of increased rice yields will be strengthened.
5. If rice yields are drastically increased, then market conditions
will require diversion of considerable resources, particularly
land, to other uses.
6. There will be even greater pressures on agriculturalists to
find solutions to low incomes in the poorest agro-climatic zones.
The remainder of this paper will deal with possible solutions to
the fifth speculation above.“lo-
Speculations on Resource Adjustments
A quick look at rice yields per rai by region and by changwat shows
a very wide range. This is due in part to inherent characteristics of
the land, in part to degree of water control, and in part to intensity
of labor use. If any amount is increased at a compound interest rate
of 7.2 per cent per year! then that amount will double in 10 years.
Hypothetically, if Kingdom-wide average rice yields were increased by




the present quantity of rice produced annually could be produced
on one-half of the area presently in rice, or
double the present quantity of rice could be produced on the
present area in rice, or
some combination of (a) and (b), such as 60 per cent more
rice on 80 per cent of the area now in rice! etc.
The above postulations are not intended in any way to suggest or recommend
a national goal of 10 per cent per year increase in rice yields and
diversion of 50 per cent of land out of rice over a 10 year period. I
don’t know of any other country
in .0 years. What the above is
kinas of targets that are going
that has been able to make such a shift
intended to do is to illustrate the
to have to be set and the kinds of adjust-
ments in resource use that are going to have to be made if Thailand is
going to solve some of these long run rice problems.
Setting of such goals or targets raises three further questions.on
be
-11-
what part of the present rice land should rapid increases in yield
sought and what part should be shifted out of rice? How
could rice yields be increased rapidly on the land selected
What crops can be produced on the land being shifted out of
should or
to stay in rice?
rice?
Definitive agro-climatic zone studies would provide some answers to
these questions and permit detailed planning of how to go about the
shift. In the absence of these studies, or while they are being under-
taken, what can be done to get the desired adjustment process started?
The growth of corn, cassava, and kenaf production indicates that
Thai farmers will rapidly adopt a new crop if it is profitable. Rapid
spread of the new rice varieties in the Suphanburi area indicates that
they will rapidly adopt new technology in a traditional crop.
Types of Land in Rice
Conceptually there are three categories of land presently in rice:
land with no alternative use but rice; land that is suitable for both
rice and other crops; and land not well suited for rice but now in rice
for some reason.
The first category of land includes vast areas in the delta, and
in scattered river valleys. Some are limited to rice because of soils,
and some because of annual deep water flooding. (8) Thailand’s comparative
advantage in rice production lies in these lands, and this advantage
can be further increased with judicious investments in resource develop-
me.~tand research. There may well be a green revolution underway in
the western part of the Choa Phya delta and in the Chieng Mai valley=:, :,.
with RD-1 and RD-3. And Thailand leads the world in developing
deep water rice technology. (11)
The second category of land is suitable for both rice and other
crops, and presents a major challenge to research and to imaginative
policy that increases resource mobility. In some cases rice yields on
this land are higher than on the first category. In other cases yields
are lower. But the important point is that this land, under present
soil and water management technology, has the potential for producing
both rice and other crops. The fact that it remains in rice raises both
resource mobility and research questions.
The third category of land does not
water at the present time. Although the
grown under swamp rice techniques, water
have a supplementary source of
paddys are bunded and rice is
comes only from rainfall and
from surface runoff of rainfall from surrounding areas. For this third
category of land~ it is technically and economically unfeasible to
d
provide supplemental irrigation from surface sources. Rice is now a
high risk crop on this land. Yields are low. The crop fails in as many
as one-half of the years, or barely returns the seed, and in some years
the land is not even planted. This marginal rice land is scattered all
over the Kingdom, but the biggest concentrations are probably in the
Northeast. Rainfall conditions also make this land risky for corn,
@ This ignores thepossibility oftubewell irrigation from ground





legumes and oilseeds. The drought tolerance of
promising materials researchers are now testing
sorghum and the
could very well
to rapid shifts from rice to sorghum on this land.
Factors Reducinq Resource Mobility
Prices are normally expected to provide the signals
resource use. Farm prices of rice in Thailand, however,
for shifts in
have been kept
at one-half to three-fourths of world levels during the past 20 years
by the rice premium. Prices of feasible alternative crops have been
free to move with world levels, or kept above world prices (cotton).
The drop in world rice prices together with the removal of the rice
premium has not led to major changes in relative prices within Thailand.
Resource shifts out of rice and into other crops due to relative prices
have already been achieved by the rice premium
different from the situation in some countries
prices have led to excess resources in rice.
in the past. This is quite
where high domestic support
Second is the question of the availability of alternative crops
for land on which it is technically feasible to grow them. This discussion
is not about the
on which nothing
discussed as the
vast areas of the first category of land in the delta
else but rice can be grown. It is about the areas
second category, suited both to rice and other crops,
and the third category, on which
are nevertheless still in rice.
lands are tradition bound and do
rice is not very well suited but which
The argument that farmers on these
not respond to economic incentives or
relative prices is not acceptable. The evidence is otherwise. Some~
however, particularly in the Northeast, have so recently joined the
market economy that production of sufficient rice to feed the family-14-
for the year still has a high priority in their farming decisions.
But when their incomes are high enough, they will be willing to buy rice
for consumption, as the corn farmers now do. But it has not yet been
demonstrated to these farmers that highly profitable alternative crops
are available to them. And this is what new technology in agriculture
is all about, namely the creation or adaption of highly profitable new
alternatives for farmers. For Thailand to adjust to long run rice
problems will require new technology to promote two kinds of resource
mobility. Category three land must shift out of rice. Category two land
must be able to shift back and forth from rice to other crops as market
forces dictate.
Some Policy Questions
This section will deal with five policy
are immediate and fairly clear in direction,
questions. The first three
and recommendations are
offered. The fourth and fifth are longer run in nature, and will require
considerable professional and public discussion and some hard choices.
The first has to do with product price policy. Thailand has in
general in the past followed a fairly open free market price policy,
wi~blseveral exceptions. The future is likely to be one of rapidly
cnanging technology in countries with which Thailand competes, and resource
adjustments in Thailand will be facilitated by allowing price signals
to come from the world market. At times there will be strong poiitical
pressures for support prices, particularly when, in a year of exceptionally-15-
good weather, grain from other Asian countries comes on the market in
a rush and has a chaotic effect on world prices. (1,3) However, trying
to play a counter-cyclical strategy by means of price stabilization on
an internationally traded commodity such as rice is very dangerous> and
trying to stabilize world rice prices could be disastrous for Thailand.
But the pressures to do something will remain. The past year’s experience
of trying to weather the sbom through confessional sales should be
studied very closely~ for it may prove to be the best~ if not the only
means. The United States probably does not provide a good model for
examining alternative policies. A good look should be given to some
o~her countries, such as Australia and wheat, for possible policy
instruments.
The second policy has to do with input prices and availability.
All attempts to solve Thai rice problems will be futile if present
fertilizer policies are maintained. Thailand has developed significant
new technology in the form of new high yielding rice varieties. But
the full potential of this technology will not be achieved at present
fertilizer prices. The policy direction is clear. The present embargo
on urea and ammonium sulfate should be abolished. There should be
free import of all fertilizers, both elements and mixed. If the Mae Moh
plant cannot compete under these conditions, then either a mistaken
investment should be acknowledged and the plant closed now, or the
plant subsidized until the foreign loan which built it is paid off.
This is not a plea for subsidized fertilizer in Thailand. It is a plea,-16-
c“n~tif Thai farmers are going to receive world level prices for their
products, then let them pay world level prices for their fertilizer.
Trying to subsidize fertilizer use on a particular croF would be futile,
for its use will shift to wherever it is most profitable. Building
a fertilizer distribution system will be difficult~ but it can be done
by the private sector, which is being discouraged from doing so by the
present policy. The government should get totally out of the fertilizer
business.
Third, the necessary research policy seems fairly clear. Agricultural
research in Thailand is likely to be most effective in increasing
f.rTn@rs’incomes if it is by commodity and specific to each agro-clima~ic
region. Rice research and extension must receive strorlgemphasis for the
areas with no alternatives to rice. Deep water rice research is particularly
important. Of equal priority is the creation of feasible and profitable
alternatives to rice on the second and third categories of land. Sorghum
as a rice replacement in the Northeast and food legumes /oilseeds in
~piand areas have already been mentioned. Corn should also be able to
carry a good share of the adjustment burden. There are several advantages
of such a strategy. First, it stresses continuing to exploit comparative
advantage on land best suited to rice. Second, it is geared to production
of commodities that are likely in the future to face stronger world
markets than rice on land that is capable of shifting in and out of rice.
Some of these commodities would also provide the inputs for an expanded
livestock sector. Third, in very poor areas it concentrates on income
level and distribution directly, rather than throwing the whole burden on rice.-17-
“Farming systems” research will be needed for some agro-clirnaticzones)
but this too is likely to be most effective when it proceeds from strong
commodity research. Long run rice problems will not be solved by con-
centrating only on rice.
There are some hazards in foliowing a general strategy such as this
if individual crop campaigns arise out of the commodity oriented research
teams. This dmger is greatest on category two and category three lands,
when a specific crop or livestock activity is pushed very hard without
attention to possible negative consequences on established production
activities in the area. Such dangers can be avoided by careful use
of agro-climatic zone specific research and development centers~ such as at
Chainat, where solid backup by corrunodity specific resei~rchis blended with
area and resource specific problems.
The fourth policy question has to do with some ve:rydifficult
choices with respect to increases in the level of income and the dis-
V
tribution of income. The areas in which there is widespread poverty
are areas in which rice doesn’t have a great potential, They are not
the areas which make up Thailand’s comparative advantage in rice production,
~ Iappreciate W.P. Falcon’s pointing out (personal communication)
that one cannot say very much about the effect of new technology on
income distribution unless one deals simultaneously with four questions:
(a) What are the economies of scale embodied in the technology?
(b) What is the distribution of farm size?
(c) How are the rural villages organized (horizontally or vertically)?
(d) Howare institutional services provided in the countryside?-18-
but instead are areas such as those bordering with Laos, Cambodia,
Malaysia, and Burma. These areas are large and contain a lot of poor
people. The directions for rice outlined thus far in this paper seem
to indicate that rice will not be the most important or effective instru-
ment for dealing with income growth and distribution in those areas,
ana some other means will have to be chosen. Trying tc)push a Kingdom-
wide rice productivity program into these poverty areas is likely to make
the whole program fail. This is not to imply that some other single
commodity or single policy might be better than riceY for rice is likely
to continue to have a
complicated, and many
to earn an acceptable
resources are made by
role in these areas. But their problems are
of these farmers do not own sufficient resources
level of income, no matter how productive these
new technology. The reader is referred to an
earlier paper for a more complete discussion of such areas. (9, p. 97-99,
or 9-11 in reprint)
Fifth, a country wanting to improve the level and distribution
of income while increasing production by technical change must also be
interested in capturing as much value added in production as possible.
In general, this requires expanding the opportunities for processing,
both orIand off farm. Very little can be done in increasing value
added to rice beyond the production stage. Most other crops have greater
possibilities of adding value that can be captured by Thailand, both domesti-
cally and through export. Examples are grains that are fed to livestock,
and fibersj to the extent that they can be processed domestically (silks“l9-
c~~ton~ kenaf) etc. Capturing the value added increases income, but
m~ess this processing is dispersed~ it can lead to more unequal regional
Income distribution. Unfortunately, processing seems to be concentrated
more and more in the Bangkok area. Thailand has a good transport situation
relative to other countries in the region. However, a simple application
of the efficiency criterion, which argues that raw material can be moved
cheaply into Bangkok for processing, is misleading when income distribution
becomes an important policy objective. Given the considerable dispersion
of rice milling that has occurred during the past 20 years, Thailand
should be able to find a way to achieve a regional dispersal of the
processing of other agricultural commodities.
Summary and Conclusions
Rapidly changing world market and production conditions make this
an opportune time to formulate a long run rice policy for Thailand. The
most reievant questions concern resources currently employed in rice
production, factors reducing their mobility and policies to increase
mobility. But these questions must be asked in the context of desired
patterns of income growth and distribution. The most pressing problem
concerns the creation and adoption of new technology in agriculture.
First priority should be given to the creation of feasible and profitable
alternatives to rice, while at the same time rapidly ir]creasingrice
yields on the land best suited to rice. Then it will be possible to
shift as much as one-half of the land-currently in rice to other crops~-20”
wh~le at the same time increasing aggregate rice output,and maintaining
the presentlevelof rice exports. To do so will requireimaginative
and forwardlookingpolicieswith respectto productprices,input
prices,research,incomedistribution and increasedopportunities for
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